Breaking the Ransomware Cycle: U.S. National Policy Options
Dr. Christopher Ford • July 19, 2021
On July 19, 2021, MITRE published a new paper by Dr. Ford and Dr. Charles Clancy on the "epidemic" of ransomware that afflicts Western countries today, and what might be done about it. You can find the paper on MITRE's website here, or download a PDF using the button below.

BREAKING THE RANSOMWARE CYCLE: U.S. NATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS
July 2021
Christopher Ford Ph.D., The MITRE Corporation
Charles Clancy Ph.D., The MITRE Corporation
Holding objects of value hostage until a ransom is paid for their release is an ancient vice, but it has acquired special salience in the digital age, as cyber criminals in this era of internet-facilitated computer network dependencies have learned to take data itself hostage in return for ransom payments.
The explosive growth of “ransomware” attacks in recent years is the result of dynamics in which the cost and risk to attackers have all but disappeared, victims’ incentives to pay promptly have increased, and the profitability of ransomware crime has duly exploded. Predictably, this has attracted steadily more predators to the “game” of digital ransom, and has produced a “feeding frenzy” of ransomware attacks, which U.S. officials have labeled a national crisis.
We will be unable to rein in the ransomware problem unless we directly address the game-theoretical incentive structures that have produced this crisis. By taking effective steps to realign these incentives—such as by incentivizing ransomware- resistant “best practices,” ending victims’ ability to pass cyber ransom costs along to insurance providers, imposing traditional “know your customer” and other associated banking regulatory practices upon cryptocurrency transactions, and taking steps to reduce cyber criminals’ ability to rely upon safe haven in jurisdictions such as Russia—we may be able to break the vicious circle in which we presently find ourselves.

Dr. Ford's article on "Thinking About Strategy in an Artificial Superintelligence Arms Race" -- co-authored with Dr. Craig Wiener -- was published in Defense & Strategic Studies Online (DASSO), vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 2025). You can find the whole issue on the DASSO website here , or use the button below to download a PDF of the Ford/Wiener article. (Also, the home page for DASSO can be found here .)

Over much of last year, Dr. Ford participated in the Senior Study Group (SSG) on Strategic Stability at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). Ably chaired by Brad Roberts of the Center for Global Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Rebeccah Heinrichs of Hudson Institute, the SSG completed its report in February 2025, only to immediately run into publication problems as a result of the government's effort to shut down the USIP. The litigation associated with that effort remains ongoing, but the SSG is pleased to be able now to publish its report. The report is not available on the USIP website, but you can use the button below to download a PDF.

The National Institute for Public Policy published Dr. Ford's article "Thinking About Russian Nuclear Weapons Thinking" in volume 5, number 2, of the Journal of Policy & Strategy (2025). You can find the whole issue on the NIPP website here , or use the button below to download a PDF of the article.

In this article in Volume 1, Issue 3 of the Missouri State Univeristy's online journal Defense & Strategic Studies Online (pp. 1-89), Dr. Christopher Ford, John Schurtz, and Erik Quam offer a detailed analytical account of how cybernetic theories of social control developed by the scientist Qian Xuesen and his disciples were adopted by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and are today critical to understanding the Party’s domestic governance and foreign relations. You can see the whole issue on DASSO's website here , read the Ford/Schurtz/Quam article here , or use the button below to access a PDF of the article.