Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and its Discontents: Challenges of "Weaponless Deterrence"
Dr. Christopher Ford • November 1, 2010
A look at the merits (and demerits) of "virtual" nuclear deterrence that relies upon productive or reconstitutive capacity. It is also available here, from Hudson Institute.
Submitted to the Conference on “Nuclear Deterrence: Its Past and Future”
Hoover Institution
(November 11-12, 2010)
Synopsis
Countervailing reconstitution (CR) – also known as “weaponless deterrence” or “virtual nuclear arsenals” – is a concept with roots going back to the beginning of the nuclear age, but which became a part of modern disarmament debates with Jonathan Schell’s book The Abolition in 1984. This paper explores a range of issues raised by CR’s central insight of trying to find a way to take advantage of nuclear deterrent dynamics in order to help provide stability against “breakout” from a regime abolishing nuclear weapons.
The study begins by discussing and evaluating a range of crisis stability critiques made against reconstitution theory by Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Kenneth Waltz, and others, explains the analytical and practical connections between reconstitution theory and current debates over nuclear force “de-alerting,” and surveys a range of issues and concerns raised by this specific application of nuclear deterrence. Among the matters discussed are: challenges of crisis stability and reconstitution “racing”; incentives for weapon design and reconstitutive technology development; the impact of missile defense and other defensive systems; “wildfire proliferation”; and problems of CR survivability. These questions are examined in particular with respect to what is termed herein a possible “Tier One” reconstitution policy – that is, the maintenance of a CR capability after the point of weapons abolition, as a matter of deliberate policy, and with deterrent and strategic “hedging” purposes in mind, rather than simply as a byproduct “option” resulting from the possession of dual-use nuclear technology.
The next part of this study examines some of the various practical and programmatic challenges that might arise if a major industrial and nuclear- knowledgeable power (e.g., the United States) tried to implement a thoroughgoing “Tier One” CR policy as a post-abolition nuclear security strategy. Drawing in part upon the post-Cold War experiences of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, it explores the many challenges of such an approach, including: uncertainties in sizing a reconstituted nuclear arsenal and its associated infrastructure based upon post-“zero” concepts of potential nuclear use and considerations of redundancy and survivability; issues of re-learning, human capital management, and knowledge retention; verification problems; delivery system retention; and the challenge resisting program atrophy over time.
The study concludes by suggesting that despite the many challenges suggested by these excursions into reconstitution theory and programmatics, CR seems nonetheless to be securing for itself an enduring role at least as tool for facilitating some additional weapons reductions. Even were “Tier One” CR deemed to be unmanageably problematic through the prism of “nuclear zero,” therefore – or were “zero” itself deemed too unworkable for a deterrence-based theory such as CR to salvage it – the basic idea of substituting potential weapons for “weapons-in-being” remains a valuable one.
Dr. Ford's article on "Thinking About Strategy in an Artificial Superintelligence Arms Race" -- co-authored with Dr. Craig Wiener -- was published in Defense & Strategic Studies Online (DASSO), vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 2025). You can find the whole issue on the DASSO website here , or use the button below to download a PDF of the Ford/Wiener article. (Also, the home page for DASSO can be found here .)
Below are the remarks Dr. Ford delivered to a webinar sponsored by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies on August 29, 2025.
Over much of last year, Dr. Ford participated in the Senior Study Group (SSG) on Strategic Stability at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). Ably chaired by Brad Roberts of the Center for Global Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Rebeccah Heinrichs of Hudson Institute, the SSG completed its report in February 2025, only to immediately run into publication problems as a result of the government's effort to shut down the USIP. The litigation associated with that effort remains ongoing, but the SSG is pleased to be able now to publish its report. The report is not available on the USIP website, but you can use the button below to download a PDF.
Below is the prepared text upon which Dr. Ford drew in his remarks to and discussions with a nuclear deterrence study group in London on July 28, 2025.
Below is the text upon which Dr. Ford based his remarks on July 22, 2025, to a conference sponsored by the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Below is the prepared text upon which Dr. Ford based his oral remarks at a conference sponsored by the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER) at Cambridge University on June 17, 2025.
Below is the text upon which Dr. Ford drew in delivering his remarks at a conference on "Transatlantic Turbulence: What Next for European Defence?" held at the University of Birmingham on June 13, 2025.
Below are the remarks Dr. Ford delivered (virtually) to a conference in Beijing on June 12, 2025, sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) and the Grandview Institution .
The National Institute for Public Policy published Dr. Ford's article "Thinking About Russian Nuclear Weapons Thinking" in volume 5, number 2, of the Journal of Policy & Strategy (2025). You can find the whole issue on the NIPP website here , or use the button below to download a PDF of the article.
In this article in Volume 1, Issue 3 of the Missouri State Univeristy's online journal Defense & Strategic Studies Online (pp. 1-89), Dr. Christopher Ford, John Schurtz, and Erik Quam offer a detailed analytical account of how cybernetic theories of social control developed by the scientist Qian Xuesen and his disciples were adopted by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and are today critical to understanding the Party’s domestic governance and foreign relations. You can see the whole issue on DASSO's website here , read the Ford/Schurtz/Quam article here , or use the button below to access a PDF of the article.