Playing for Time on the Edge of the Apocalypse: Maximizing Decision Time for Nuclear Leaders
Dr. Christopher Ford • November 11, 2010
This paper explores debates over nuclear weapons "de-alerting" and other challenges. It is also available here, from Hudson Institute.
Paper Presented to the Conference on “Nuclear Deterrence: Its Past and Future”
Hoover Institution
(November 11, 2010)
Synopsis
This paper surveys post-Cold War disputes over the “de-alerting” of nuclear weapons, outlining critiques made of the launch-on-warning capabilities – and what are alleged to be the de facto launch-on-warning policies – of the United States and Russia, as well as the deterrence-focused counter-narrative that has developed in response to these arguments. It offers an analysis of such debates as an expression of a dynamic tension within nuclear command and control systems between “Type A” risks of nuclear use (advertence) and “Type B” risks of nuclear accidents (inadvertence) – a tension that can be further understood with reference to theories of organizational behavior informed by Complexity Theory insights into the “fitness” of complex adaptive systems.
Exploring the potential Type A and Type B implications of various proposed measures for reducing nuclear risks, the author suggests that the policy stalemate created by the need for tradeoffs between deterrent value and accident risk- reduction can perhaps be broken by focusing less upon de-alerting per se and more upon the challenge of maximizing the effective decision-time available to national leaders in a nuclear crisis – a broader discourse of which de-alerting debates are merely a subset.
Below is an edited version of the prepared text upon which Dr. Ford based his oral comments at a conference on “U.S. Future Options for Deterrence and Arms Control,” in Washington, D.C., on September 29, 2026, sponsored by the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding of the Geneva Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies.
Below is an edited version of prepared text upon which Professor Ford based his shorter oral remarks on a panel on “Arms Control and Nuclear Risk Reduction” at the India-U.S. Strategic Dialogue held in New Delhi on September 18, 2026, sponsored by MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy and the Observer Research Foundation .
Below follows the prepared text upon which Professor Ford based his remarks to a Defense Department audience near Las Vegas on September 3, 2026.
Below is an edited version of the prepared text upon which Professor Ford based his remarks to a workshop on theater nuclear weaponry sponsored by the Sandia Security Studies Institute at the Sandia National Laboratory on August 31, 2026.
Below appears the text upon which Dr. Ford based his shorter oral remarks on August 6, 2026, to a professional offsite meeting of a team of engineers from a major defense contractor working on conventionally armed precision-strike technologies.
Dr. Ford's article on the conceptual challenges of "tailoring" nuclear deterrence -- and suggesting a more robust and muscular alternative approach -- was published in Missouri State University's journal Defense & Strategic Studies Online (DASSO) in July 2026. You can find DASSO's webpage here , and an online copy of Dr. Ford's article here -- or use the button below to download a PDF. (This paper was also published in the Journal of Policy and Strategy , vol. 6, no 2 (2026), pp. 19-38, and can be found here .)
INHR published Professor Ford's latest essay on Artificial Intelligence and nuclear weapons on July 7, 2026. You can find the essay on INHR's website here , or read the text of his comments below.
War on the Rocks published Dr. Ford's essay "A New Force Posture Concept for Europeanizing Extended Nuclear Deterrence" on June 29, 2026.
Below is the text upon which Dr. Ford based his shorter remarks to a meeting with the class of Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Scholars for 2026.
Below is the text of Dr. Ford's remarks at a dinner event in London on June 16, 2026.