Playing for Time on the Edge of the Apocalypse: Maximizing Decision Time for Nuclear Leaders
Dr. Christopher Ford • November 11, 2010
This paper explores debates over nuclear weapons "de-alerting" and other challenges. It is also available here, from Hudson Institute.
Paper Presented to the Conference on “Nuclear Deterrence: Its Past and Future”
Hoover Institution
(November 11, 2010)
Synopsis
This paper surveys post-Cold War disputes over the “de-alerting” of nuclear weapons, outlining critiques made of the launch-on-warning capabilities – and what are alleged to be the de facto launch-on-warning policies – of the United States and Russia, as well as the deterrence-focused counter-narrative that has developed in response to these arguments. It offers an analysis of such debates as an expression of a dynamic tension within nuclear command and control systems between “Type A” risks of nuclear use (advertence) and “Type B” risks of nuclear accidents (inadvertence) – a tension that can be further understood with reference to theories of organizational behavior informed by Complexity Theory insights into the “fitness” of complex adaptive systems.
Exploring the potential Type A and Type B implications of various proposed measures for reducing nuclear risks, the author suggests that the policy stalemate created by the need for tradeoffs between deterrent value and accident risk- reduction can perhaps be broken by focusing less upon de-alerting per se and more upon the challenge of maximizing the effective decision-time available to national leaders in a nuclear crisis – a broader discourse of which de-alerting debates are merely a subset.
Below is the prepared text upon which Dr. Ford based his comments to a conference on May 28, 2026, sponsored by the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Below are the prepared remarks on which Dr. Ford based his comments at a meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland, on April 18, 2026, discussing U.S.-Russian relations after the expiration of the New START agreement.
Below are the remarks Dr. Ford delivered on a panel at the NATO Nuclear Policy Symposium in Istanbul , Türkiye, on April 21, 2026.
Dr. Ford's article arguing for a "neo-legitimist" approach to international law and law-making was published in Missouri State University's journal Defense & Strategic Studies Online (DASSO) in April 2026. You can find DASSO's webpage here , and an online copy of Dr. Ford's article here -- or use the button below to download a PDF.
Below is the essay of Dr. Ford's that INHR published on April 10, 2026. The essay can be found on the INHR website here , or read the text below.
Below is the essay of Dr. Ford's that INHR published on March 27, 2026. The essay can be found on the INHR website here , or read the text below.
Below is the essay of Dr. Ford's that INHR published on March 12, 2026. The essay can be found on the INHR website here, or read the text below.
The March-April 2026 edition of the Foreign Service Journal published Dr. Ford's article entitled "Negotiating Nuclear Security: A View from the First Trump Administration." You can find the article online by clicking here .
Dr. Ford's article entitled " Marxing America Great Again: Marxist Discourse in Right-Wing Populism and the Future of Geopolitics " was published in Defense & Strategic Studies Online (DASSO), vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 2026). You can find the whole issue on the DASSO website here , or use the button below to download a PDF of Dr. Ford's piece. (Also, the home page for DASSO can be found here .)
Below is an lightly edited version of the prepared text upon which Dr. Ford based his remarks on February 4, 2026, at the conference on "Regional Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Prague, Czech Republic.